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Workplace Flexibility and Worker Resilience:  
The Role of Teleworkability in the COVID-19 Pandemic  
Abstract 
The unexpected outbreak of COVID-19 has thrown a spotlight on the importance of telework. 
With the massive lockdown order, teleworkability, i.e., whether workers’ jobs are teleworkable, 
plays an important role in determining whether workers can maintain their productivity during 
the pandemic, which in turn has consequences for their resilience to the COVID-induced labor 
market disruptions. However, the impact of teleworkability is likely to be heterogeneous, varying 
by internet infrastructure, job characteristics, and worker characteristics, such as gender. In this 
paper, we examine the average and heterogeneous impact of teleworkability on workers’ 
resilience to the COVID-induced labor market disruptions in terms of the unemployment rate, 
work absence rate, and layoff rate. To do this, we compile a rich dataset, including data on 
different implementation dates of the stay-at-home order across U.S. counties, employment data 
from Current Population Survey (CPS), broadband coverage data from Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), and occupation-based teleworkability and automatability measure based on 
surveys from O*NET. Using stay-at-home order as a measure of labor market disruption, and 
leveraging the staggered implementation of the stay-at-home order across counties, we find that 
teleworkability can offset the increase in the unemployment rate due to the stay-at-home order by 
51.5%, that in work absence rate by 54.9%, and that in layoff rate by 51.7%. We further show 
that the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is i) stronger for those living in 
areas with higher broadband coverage; ii) stronger for those whose jobs are at risk of being 
automated; iii) stronger for females without kids than their male counterparts. Our study 
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contributes to the emerging literature on how to enhance societal resilience in facing a pandemic 
by underscoring the nuanced impact of teleworkability. 




1. Introduction  
COVID-19 and the associated stay-at-home order have engendered a tidal wave of long-term 
unemployment in the United States. According to the Labor Department, 3.6 million workers had 
been unemployed for 27 weeks or more (i.e., long-term unemployed) in October1 and many job 
losses are likely permanent.2 During the massive pandemic-induced job loss, an important 
question for the society to address is how to prepare and improve workers’ resilience to similar 
catastrophic events. In the labor context, workers’ resilience denotes they are less likely to be 
unemployed due to labor market disruptions or crises. 
Two trends that take place and have been discussed a lot during this time are telework and 
automation. Telework or teleworking refers to a work flexibility arrangement under which an 
employee performs the duties and responsibilities of such employee’s position, and other 
authorized activities, from an approved worksite other than the location from which the 
employee would otherwise work.3 Automation is the technology by which a process or procedure 
is performed with minimal human assistance (Wikipedia). Telework and automation, if in place, 
allow for work continuity and fast response to workplace disruption. However, for most firms, 
automation is not yet in place and requires long-term planning and high fixed costs and takes a 
longer time to implement. Therefore, automation is not a valid immediate response to the 
national emergency declaration and county-level stay-at-home order. Yet, the pandemic has 
certainly pushed firms to seriously consider automation as an alternative to human workers. 
Telework, on the other hand, can be implemented more swiftly. The need to protect workers 








requiring workers to commute back to traditional workplaces. Nowadays, teleworking is 
becoming the new reality. According to a survey by Gallup, around 62% of workers are working 
from home during the pandemic.4  
In the massive shift to telework during the pandemic, teleworkability, i.e., whether workers’ 
jobs are teleworkable, is central to their fight against the widespread pandemic-induced job 
losses. While avoiding virus transmission in the workplace or their commute to work, telework 
can help workers maintain their productivity and keep their jobs. As such, we argue that 
teleworkability can help to improve workers’ resilience for the following reasons. For one thing, 
by increasing the permeability of work across time and space, teleworkability can potentially 
reduce commute time and improve workers’ response time (Bloom et al. 2015). For another, 
teleworkability provides workers higher flexibility in work scheduling, helps them alleviate the 
work-family conflict (Choudhury et al. 2020), and reduces absence due to family responsibilities, 
which subsequently leads to a positive effect on their productivity and employment. 
However, the potential positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience has not been 
empirically proven. There is an emerging literature suggesting that telework can bring more 
freedom and flexibility to workers (e.g., Crossan and Burton 1993; Duxbury et al. 1999); 
increase workers’ productivity and job satisfaction (Bloom et al. 2015). Moreover, some recent 
working papers investigate the prevalence of telework and what characteristics are related to the 
participation of telework (e.g., Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Bick et al. 2020; Brynjolfsson et al.). 
Despite the recent effort on telework status, little research attention has been given to the impact 
of teleworkability on their resilience to labor market disruptions due to catastrophic events, such 





requires necessary telecommunication infrastructure in place; the impact of teleworkability is 
also likely to be heterogeneous, varying by job characteristics (e.g. automatability), and worker 
characteristics (such as gender), which warrants further investigations. 
When teleworking remotely, workers often need complementary devices and services that 
support the fulfillment of their work, such as high-speed Internet access. According to Dettling 
(2017), teleworkers’ productivities are highly related to their access to the high-speed Internet. 
Accordingly, the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience may be substantially 
heterogeneous across geographic areas with different broadband coverages. For instance, 
workers living in areas with higher broadband coverage are likely to benefit more from 
teleworkability than those in areas with lower broadband coverage in terms of accessing 
information and collaborating with colleagues.  
As noted earlier, automation is another longer-term alternative for firms to minimize the 
risks involved in the potential workplace or labor market disruptions, such as virus outbreaks or 
other natural disasters.  Various anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are accelerating the pace 
of automation during the pandemic.5 The accelerated pace of automation during the pandemic-
induced economic downturn echoes the stream of literature suggesting that economic downturns 
tend to provide stronger incentives for firms to perform technology upgrades and labor-
technology substitution (Schumpeter 1939; Zhang 2019; Blit 2020). Following the increasing 
drive to adopt automation, firms will also need to reallocate their resources by displacing those 
workers who are less needed in the automation surge, particularly those workers whose jobs are 
automated (Autor and Dorn 2013). According to prior studies occupations (Autor 2015; Lordan 
2019; Zhang 2019), during the process of automation, firms tend to replace human workers in 
 
5 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-14/pandemic-may-permanently-replace-some-human-jobs-
with-machines and https://www.wired.com/story/pandemic-propelling-new-wave-automation/  
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those automatable occupations while increasing their employment in those non-automatable. Yet 
it is unclear whether the impact of the stay-at-home order on workers’ resilience varies by job 
automatability. To fill this gap, we consider Fabrizio’ and Tsolmon’s (2014) estimate of the risk 
of jobs being replaced by automation as the measure of automatability. This measure takes 
account of both the routine intensity of tasks involved in jobs (Autor and Dorn 2013) and recent 
advances of Machine Learning (ML) in some specific tasks (e.g., translation). 
Given that both telework and automation are promising strategies to help firms to curb 
COVID-19 spread, it would be interesting to investigate the following open question: what is the 
impact of job teleworkability and automatability on workers’ resilience to workplace or labor 
market disruption? The pandemic offers a natural experiment to answer this question. We 
distinguish jobs into four categories depending on whether the jobs are teleworkable and 
automatable. Specifically, for teleworkable jobs, firms can leverage teleworkability to maintain 
work continuity during the pandemic, and therefore are less likely to resort to automation as the 
solution. However, for non-teleworkable jobs, workers are facing a higher risk of workplace 
outbreaks and tend to have a lower production level than teleworkers during the pandemic. If 
those non-teleworkable jobs are automatable, the health risk of employing human workers and 
the feasibility of automation jointly provide stronger incentives for firms to automate those jobs 
and displace those workers in those occupations permanently (Zhang 2019). Conversely, those 
workers in non-teleworkable but automatable occupations tend to confront the double whammy 
of the coronavirus-induced job cuts in the digital conversion and the replacement by automation. 
On the contrary, for those non-teleworkable and non-automatable jobs, since there are a lot of 
technological bottlenecks to inhibit the automation, firms may cope with the stay-at-home order 
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by temporarily furloughing some workers instead of permanently displacing them, suggesting 
that a likely smaller negative effect of the stay-at-home order on their employment. 
Further, the effect of teleworkability may vary with worker characteristics, such as gender. 
On the one hand, females have a higher need for flexibility (Mas and Pallais 2017). Further, due 
to the increasing need for childcare and housework amid the pandemic, females are likely to 
need flexibility more than males to alleviate the work-family conflict, suggesting that 
teleworkability is likely to be more critical and beneficial to females than males. On the other 
hand, even with the increased flexibility from telework, the school closure during the pandemic 
may put females in a disadvantaged position because it becomes even more difficult to maintain 
the work-life balance and in fact, women may find themselves having to sacrifice work or 
constantly being distracted due to working with kids around (Lyttelton et al. 2020).  Hence, we 
examine if females indeed benefit more than males from teleworkability and if the positive effect 
of teleworkability depends on whether they have kid(s). 
To sum up, we aim to answer the following research questions:  
1) How do teleworkability and the likely complementary Internet bandwidth affect workers’ 
resilience to the stay-at-home order in terms of their employment status?  
2) How does the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience vary by job characteristics 
(i.e., the likelihood to be substituted by automation)? 
3) How does the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience vary by gender and the 
childcare constraint? 
To answer our research questions, we compile a rich dataset, including employment data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS), data on different implementation dates of the stay-at-
home order across U.S. counties, occupation-based teleworkability measure from O*NET 
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(Dingel and Neiman 2020), and broadband coverage data from FCC. To build a county-level 
panel, we match the CPS respondent’s occupation code with the occupation-based 
teleworkability measure proposed by Dingel and Neiman (2020) to classify teleworkable and 
non-teleworkable jobs and calculate their averages in multiple employment measures (i.e., 
unemployment, work absence, and layoff) within each county. With the automatability measure 
from Fabrizio and Tsolmon (2014) that characterizes the risk of human workers being replaced 
by machines in each occupation, we further examine potential heterogeneous impacts of 
teleworkability across occupations with different automatabilities by comparing the averages of 
workers’ employment measures in the following four groups: 1) non-teleworkable and 
automatable; 2) non-teleworkable and non-automatable; 3) teleworkable and automatable; 4) 
teleworkable and non-automatable. Further, to test the potential heterogeneous impact of 
teleworkability across gender, we group CPS respondents based on their genders and job 
teleworkability and further estimate the within-county gender difference in the effectiveness of 
teleworkability in improving workers’ resilience. By doing that, we examine if teleworkability 
can help to reduce gender inequality in the labor market. That said, due to the increased need for 
childcare amid the pandemic, females may be put in a disadvantaged position than males, 
especially for females with kids. Accordingly, we test if the positive effect of teleworkability is 
weaker for females with kid(s). 
Leveraging the staggered implementation of the stay-at-home order across counties, we first 
find that, for non-teleworkable workers, the stay-at-home order increases their unemployment 
rate by 0.114, work absence rate by 0.146, and layoff by 0.110. We further document the positive 
effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience to job loss induced by the stay-at-home order. 
Compared with non-teleworkable workers in the same county, teleworkability can offset the 
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increase in the unemployment rate due to the stay-at-home order by 51.5%, that in work absence 
rate by 54.9%, and that in layoff rate by 51.7%. Moreover, we find that, as broadband coverage 
increases, the positive effect of teleworkability in reducing unemployment and layoff becomes 
stronger. Meanwhile, we find that, among the four occupation groups (i.e., non-teleworkable and 
automatable; non-teleworkable and non-automatable; teleworkable and automatable; 
teleworkable and non-automatable), workers in non-teleworkable and automatable occupations 
tend to be hit the hardest by the stay-at-home order. Meanwhile, the positive effect of 
teleworkability is stronger for workers in automatable occupations. Additionally, teleworkability 
can help to narrow economic inequality to some extent. The positive effect of teleworkability on 
workers’ resilience is stronger for females without kids than for their male counterparts. 
Nevertheless, due to the high childcare constraint during the pandemic, the positive effect of 
teleworkability is weaker for females with kid(s) than for females without kid(s). 
Our triple-difference (DDD) estimate is validated by the parallel trend test. We find highly 
consistent results at different levels of analysis (e.g., county-week, county-month, and 
individual-month) or with alternative definitions of stay-at-home orders (e.g., the workplace-
closure date). Moreover, we find similar results when we exploit the time-varying case rate 
across counties to measure the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience. Further, 
we find consistent results after controlling for the time-varying state-level variations in 
unemployment benefit or using an alternative counterfactual estimation approach to measure the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of labor market disruptions induced by the 
COVID-19. In addition, results remain consistent when we leverage the county-level difference 
in terms of the distribution of workers in teleworkable vs. non-teleworkable jobs to examine the 
positive effect of teleworkability. 
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We make several contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to a better 
understanding of the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience using the context of 
the COVID-19 stay-at-home order. By leveraging the staggered implementation of the stay-at-
home order across counties, we establish that teleworkable workers significantly have a lower 
unemployment rate, work absences rate, and layoff rate than non-teleworkable workers under the 
stay-at-home order. We also show heterogeneous impacts of teleworkability on workers’ 
resilience across geographic areas with different broadband coverages, across occupations at 
high vs. low risk of being automated, and across genders. Second, we contribute to the literature 
by underscoring the impact of teleworkability on socioeconomic inequality. On the one hand, we 
find that digital inequality, particularly broadband inequality, may translate to rising income 
inequality in the shift to telework. On the other hand, we show that, by offering workers more 
flexibility, telework can help to narrow the gender difference in employment when there is no 
childcare constraint.  
Our study has important implications for public policy and workers. Our study indicates that 
governors should increase broadband coverage to boost the positive effect of teleworkability. 
Moreover, governors should consider subsidizing investment in broadband infrastructure and 
control the price of high-speed internet access in economically vulnerable counties in order to 
close limit the consequences of the potential digital divide resulting from differences in Internet 
infrastructure. Further, firms should consider the heterogeneity in need for flexibility and 
telework. Firms are advised to provide workers the telework option and more guidance on how 
to telework efficiently. Additionally, since teleworkability is more important to female workers 
and workers in automatable jobs, those workers should acquire more telework soft skills and 
improve home technologies (e.g., Internet, computers) to maximize their telework productivity.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 COVID-19 and the Stay-at-home Order 
COVID-19 has radically transformed various aspects of people’s jobs, life, and well-being. 
It is considered as the most serious episode in the past ten decades (Ferguson et al. 2020) and 
causes a significant economic downturn. Although COVID-19 shares some similarities with 
previous economic downturns, there is a stark difference between COVID-19 and previous 
economic downturns, that is, to reduce the spread of the virus, governors impose the mandatory 
stay-at-home order or other similar social distancing policies. Recent studies have found that the 
stay-at-home order has a profound effect on the economy and labor market on average as well as 
remarkable unequal impacts across workers. 
According to Ludvigson et al. (2020), COVID-19 and the stay-at-home order lead to a 
12.75 % drop in industrial production and a 17 % loss in service employment. As further pointed 
out by Coibion et al. (2020), it is the stay-at-home order that leads to a reduction in consumption 
and employment instead of the COVID-19 pandemic. The welfare loss due to the “non-working 
days” under the stay-at-home order amounts to $7 trillion per year, in which only $2 trillion can 
be offset by the medical protection procedures (e.g., contact tracking) (Mulligan 2020). Along 
with the massive shutdown, the stay-at-home order is suggested to lead to a plummet in job 
vacancies (Kahn et al. 2020) and a jump in the unemployment rate (Gupta et al. 2020).   
Further, there is an emerging literature suggesting that the COVID-19 and the stay-at-home 
policy is likely to widen income equality across demographic groups. For one thing, due to the 
closure of schools and the increased need for childcare, the stay-at-home order may have a 
disproportionately negative impact on females’ income and employment (Adams-Prassl et al. 
2020; Forsythe 2020; Yasenov 2020), which leads to a wider gender wage gap (Czymara et al. 
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2020). For another, the stay-at-home is likely to have a stronger negative effect on the earnings 
of younger workers (Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Yasenov 2020), those with lower levels of 
education (Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Yasenov 2020), and the minority groups (Fairlie et al. 
2020; Montenovo et al. 2020). Unlike prior studies focusing on the potential unequal effect of 
the stay-at-home order on different domestic groups’ earnings, we emphasize how to leverage 
teleworkability and its complement to narrow the economic inequality gap and increase the 
resilience for workers living in less developed areas, workers whose jobs are at risk of being 
automated, and female workers. 
2.2 Workplace Flexibility and Resilience  
Workplace flexibility is defined as whether workers have the ability to decide when, where, and 
for how long they perform work-related tasks (Hill et al. 2014). Workplace flexibility (e.g., 
telework) has been found to effectively improve worker productivity by decreasing absenteeism 
(Baltes et al. 1999); improving response time (Bloom et al. 2015); developing a higher 
commitment to the firm (Kelliher and Anderson 2008); and reducing work-life conflict (Hill et 
al. 2014). According to a seminal study conducted by Bloom et al. (2015), telework, a common 
practice of workplace flexibility, can lead to a 13% increase in workers’ performance by 
reducing sick days and improving the convenience of the working environment. Nevertheless, 
workplace flexibility is not a panacea. Prior studies suggest that it may lead to professional and 
social isolation, which can subsequently reduce employee development activities (Cooper and 
Kurland 2002) and promotion rate (Bloom et al. 2015). 
Apart from the outcomes of workplace flexibility, another important research focus in the 
literature is the measure of feasibility of workplace flexibility. Given that telework is the most 
commonly applied workplace flexibility practice (Coenen and Kok 2014), most of the related 
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literature focuses on the feasibility of telework. Dingel and Neiman (2020) propose a way to 
measure the feasibility of telework for each occupation based on several related questions asked 
in the Work Context Questionnaire and Generalized Work Activities Questionnaire from 
O*NET. According to their estimate, in the United States, 37% of jobs are teleworkable and the 
share of teleworkable jobs tend to be lower in lower-income economies. Mongey et al. (2020) 
further propose a similar measure of the likelihood that jobs can be done at home and an 
additional measure of the physical proximity to others at work. With their two measures, they 
find that workers in jobs with low teleworkability and high physical proximity tend to be less 
educated and more economically vulnerable.   
While the impact and feasibility of workplace flexibility on work performance have been 
intensively investigated, there exists yet little empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
workplace flexibility on worker resilience, in particular their resilience to workplace disruptions. 
The only related study that we are aware of is MacEachen et al. (2018), which suggests that 
workplace flexibility can help workers maintain the work-life balance, reduce occupational 
health issues, and thus improve their resilience. Formally, worker resilience entails the potential 
to be resilient in cases of adversity and make positive adaption (Coenen and Kok 2014; 
Hartmann et al. 2020). The extant literature on worker resilience primarily uses surveys or 
interviews to measure workers’ self-report confidence and ability in coping with difficult times 
based on hypothetical questions (e.g., Wagnild and Young 1993; Nordbäck et al. 2017; 
MacEachen et al. 2018). However, as Hartmann et al. (2020) notes that, resilience can only be 
manifested in face of adversity. In this regard, the COVID-19 pandemic, the most serious 
episode in the past ten decades (Ferguson et al. 2020), offers a natural experiment for researchers 
to empirically examine worker resilience to workplace disruptions due to catastrophic events. By 
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extending this stream of literature, we leverage the feasibility of telework measure proposed by 
Dingel and Neiman (2020) and identify its impact on workers’ resilience to the COVID-induced 
disruptions and its heterogeneity by internet infrastructure, job characteristics, and gender. 
In addition, several working papers also use the natural experiment of COVID-19 to study 
workplace flexibility (Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Bick et al. 2020; Brynjolfsson et al. 2020). Most 
of these studies focus on the prevalence of workplace flexibility and what worker 
characteristics are related to the practice of workplace flexibility (e.g., telework). For instance, 
Brynjolfsson et al. (2020) conduct surveys in April and May in the United States and find that 
34.1% of employed respondents switched from commuting to teleworking. They suggest that 
females and younger workers (above age 25) are more likely to switch from commuting to 
teleworking. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) conduct surveys to collect information regarding a more 
granular measure of teleworkability, i.e., what share of tasks they could do from home in their 
main jobs. They find that those jobs with high pre-existing teleworkable share tend to be more 
likely to become fully teleworkable than other jobs; females tend to have a lower share of 
teleworkable tasks than males even after controlling for the occupation or industry effect. As a 
complement to the literature on the prevalence of workplace flexibility during the pandemic, we 
analyze the impact of the feasibility of workplace flexibility (i.e., teleworkability) on worker 
resilience to labor market disruptions due to a catastrophic event and extensively investigate 
heterogeneous effects of teleworkability by considering more contextual factors. Additionally, 
unlike most of those working papers primarily covering the early stage of pandemic and relying 
on self-conducted surveys, we employ the DID design to examine the impact of the feasibility of 
workplace flexibility (i.e., teleworkability) with census data and other data sources for different 
area units in a longer time period. 
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2.3 Automation and Job Upskilling 
Apart from changing where people work, COVID-19 and the stay-at-home order may have a 
more profound and long-lasting effect on what work is needed and how work is performed by 
speeding up the pace of automation. This is consistent with the growing literature on the 
automation trend during economic downturns (Schumpeter 1939; Zhang 2019; Blit 2020), which 
suggests that economic downturns tend to provide stronger incentives for firms to perform 
technology upgrades and replace human workers with automation (Zhang 2019).  
The concern about the substitution between automation and employment has been long 
explored and become more and more important as the penetration of computers into workplaces. 
As proposed and confirmed by Autor and Dorn (2013), as the computer power becomes cheaper, 
routine tasks are becoming automated and low skill workers in non-service occupations are 
likely to reallocate their labor supply to service occupations. Here, routine tasks are defined as 
tasks that can be fully codified and do not need high-level reasoning (Autor 2015), and can be 
classified based on RTI (Routine Task-Intensity) (Autor and Dorn 2013). Inspired by the fact 
that the risk of virus spreads is highly correlated with interpersonal interactions, Chernoff and 
Warman (2020) further add an interpersonal measure to reflect the viral transmission risk and 
construct a new measure of RTI.  
However, with recent advances in Machine Learning (ML), more and more tasks that used 
to be classified as non-routine ones have now become automatable, such as deciphering 
handwriting or translating (Frey and Osborne 2017). To further incorporate recent progress in 
computerization in non-routine tasks, Frey and Osborne (2017) combine both subjective 
judgments from ML researchers and objective measures about the potential bottlenecks to 
automation to infer the probability of an occupation being automated with a Gaussian process 
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classifier. Workers in those occupations with a high probability of being automated due to the 
routinization of their tasks or technological progress are more likely to lose their jobs to robots 
(Frey and Osborne 2017). Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) estimate that one robot per thousand 
workers can lead to a 0.2% decrease in employment rate and a 0.42% decrease in wage. Josten 
and Lordan (2020) further distinguish two types of automatable jobs, including fully automatable 
jobs (in which technology can substitute human employees) and polarized automatable (in which 
human employees are still needed). They emphasize that 35% of jobs will be fully automatable 
in the following decade. Building on the extant literature on automatability, we investigate how 
the positive effect of teleworkability varies across occupations with different automatabilities.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Teleworkability on Workers' Resilience 
Teleworkability can help to ensure workers’ productivity while protecting them from potential 
virus transmissions and improve their resilience. For teleworkable jobs, workers usually still 
have comparable or even higher productivity when working from home (Bloom et al. 2015), 
such as office clerks. When shifting to telework, workers can save commuting time and reduce 
potential exposure to the virus during the pandemic. Besides, by increasing the permeability of 
work across time and space, telework can potentially improve workers’ response time. By 
comparison, for non-teleworkable jobs, such as restaurant workers, it is more difficult to enforce 
the social distance policy (Avdiu and Nayyar 2020) and firms are at high risk of future 
shutdowns. Those unpredictable interruptions in production and the challenge of the slow 
recovery are likely to negatively affect workers’ productivity and their resilience. 
Furthermore, teleworkability can provide workers higher flexibility in work scheduling and 
help them alleviate the work-family conflict, which subsequently leads to a positive effect on 
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their productivity and employment. Prior studies find that telework is more beneficial to workers 
who have a heavier domestic burden and greater work-family strain (Michel et al. 2011). 
Especially during the pandemic stay-at-home period, the school closure and the risks of dining at 
restaurants may contribute to greater family demands in childcare and housework, suggesting a 
greater need for flexibility. In such a case, the high flexibility given by teleworkability can help 
workers to relieve the work-family conflict and subsequently reduce absence due to family 
responsibilities (Choudhury et al. 2020). Bearing this in mind, we propose: 
H1a: Teleworkability improves workers’ resilience to workplace disruption. 
However, teleworkers’ work efficiency and productivity are likely to be hindered by the 
constraint of high-speed Internet coverage, which may limit the positive effect of teleworkability 
on workers’ resilience. As suggested by Dettling (2017), telework may become less feasible and 
face various technical problems without high-speed Internet access. More importantly, living in 
areas with lower high-speed Internet coverage may limit the workers’ response time and 
undermine their collaboration with colleagues. For instance, teleworkers in areas with a lower 
high-speed Internet coverage may suffer from delay while searching and processing information 
online; communicating with supervisors or customers; etc. Accordingly, high-speed Internet 
coverage may moderate the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience. Therefore, we 
propose the following hypotheses: 
H1b: The effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is stronger in areas with higher 
high-speed Internet coverage. 
3.2 Teleworkability and Automation on Workers' Resilience 
Apart from telework, automation is another approach for firms to protect their operations from 
potential shutdowns due to virus outbreaks and maintain their productivity during the pandemic 
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stay-at-home period. Automation can reduce the risk of human exposure to the virus and ensure 
that business operations run smoothly. When firms adopt automation technologies, they also 
need to reallocate their labor resources (especially job upskilling) (Hershbein and Kahn 2018; 
Dixon et al. 2019). In such a case, firms tend to reduce labor demand at those automated 
occupations and increase their demand at occupations that can be complemented by automation 
technologies (Autor 2015). The polarized labor demand following skill-biased technology 
change has been found in several studies (e.g., Autor and Dorn 2013; Hershbein and Kahn 2018).  
However, whether firms have a strong incentive to adopt automation technologies during 
the pandemic period is likely to depend on their opportunity costs (Zhang 2019), which is likely 
to be associated with workers’ existing productivity and the teleworkability of those jobs. As 
suggested by the Schumpeterian opportunity cost hypothesis (Fabrizio and Tsolmon, 2014), 
transformative technology changes such as automation usually come with high opportunity costs 
due to production interruptions during the change process. Accordingly, as the existing 
productivity level becomes lower, firms tend to have a stronger incentive to adopt automation 
technologies and replace human workers (Zhang 2019). Since whether workers can maintain 
their productivity during the stay-at-home period largely depends on the teleworkability of their 
jobs, teleworkability can help to weaken the incentive for firms to turn to automation to restore 
their productivity. This implies that there may be an interaction effect between automation and 
teleworkability on workers’ employment status.   
For those workers whose jobs can be substituted by automation, automation is a major 
threat to their resilience (Jaimovich and Siu 2020). In such a case, teleworkability can potentially 
help them keep comparable productivity during the pandemic stay-at-home period and reduce the 
incentive for firms to automation, which contributes to a positive effect on workers’ resilience. 
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On the contrary, for those workers whose jobs cannot be substituted by automation, firms can 
only rely on them, human workers, to perform their work. Regardless of whether those non-
automatable jobs are teleworkable or not, their resilience is relatively high and less susceptible to 
negative business cycle shocks. Taken together, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H2: The positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is stronger for workers 
whose jobs are more substitutable by automation.  
3.3 Teleworkability on Workers' Resilience by Gender 
On the one hand, as telework could improve workers’ resilience by enhancing the flexibility in 
work scheduling and alleviating the work-family conflict, females who usually have greater 
family responsibilities in housework are likely to be particularly affected. The gender inequality 
in housework has been established in multiple prior studies (e.g., Bianchi et al. 2000; Gelbach 
2002; Hook 2010). For instance, Hook (2010) finds that females tend to do more time-inflexible 
housework when there is less public childcare. Bianchi et al. (2000) suggest that females do the 
majority of housework and childcare, even for dual-career couples. Females are also found to 
have a higher need for flexibility (Mas and Pallais 2017) and a short commute (Barbanchon et al. 
2020). As such, telework potentially plays a more important role for females during the 
pandemic due to the increased need for family responsibilities in housework and childcare.  
On the other hand, the COVID-19 and stay-at-home order are likely to disproportionally 
induce more childcare constraint to females than to males, which may pose a stronger limitation 
on teleworkable females’ productivity than teleworkable males’. Some recent studies on the 
COVID-19 pandemic suggest that the increased need for childcare during the stay-at-home 
period may have a stronger negative impact on females’ working hours and productivity than 
males’. Heggeness (2020) suggests that school closure during the COVID-19 tends to increase 
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the share of females who have a job but not be working. Similarly, Collins et al. (2020) find that 
females significantly reduce their working hours, particularly those with young children, whereas 
there is very little change in working hours of males with children. Even among workers with 
teleworkability, as indicated by a working paper based on the 2003-2018 American Time Use 
Survey (ATUS) data (Lyttelton et al. 2020), teleworking mothers tend to spend more time on 
housework and are more likely to work with kids around than their male counterparts, suggesting 
that the COVID-induced childcare constraint is likely to have a stronger negative impact on 
teleworkable females than males. Hence, we propose two competing hypotheses:  
H3a: The positive effect of teleworkability is stronger for females than males. 
H3b: The positive effect of teleworkability is weaker for females than males. 
Given that the increased need for childcare during the stay-at-home period is likely to have 
a negative impact on females’ work and employment, we formally propose another hypothesis: 
H3c: The positive effect of teleworkability is weaker for females with childcare 
constraints than those without during lockdown. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  




To test our hypotheses, we compile a rich dataset. First, we obtain the implementation date of the 
stay-at-home order for each county from Kileen et al. (2020) and the Oxford COVID-19 
Government Response Tracker (COVID-19 GRT).6 Second, to measure workers’ employment 
status, we use the CPS monthly survey conducted by the Bureau of Census for the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) from February 2020 to June 2020, including all the respondents aged 
between 15 and 64 (i.e., the working-age population). The data set contains information 
regarding respondents’ characteristics (e.g., gender, location, occupation, etc.) and the following 
three measures related to their employment status: 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 indicates whether the 
respondent was unemployed;7 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 denotes whether the respondent had a job from 
which he was temporarily absent due to reasons other than layoff;8 Layoff denotes whether the 
respondent had a job from which he was temporarily absent due to layoff.9 According to BLS’s 
instructions for CPS surveys during the pandemic (BLS 2020), all workers absent from work due 
to coronavirus-related business closures are classified as unemployed and layoff as well.10 
Third, we match each respondent’s occupation code with the occupation-based teleworkability 
measure proposed by Dingel and Neiman (2020) to classify teleworkable and non-teleworkable 
 
6 The data is available at  https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-
tracker (state-level lockdown orders) and https://github.com/JieYingWu/COVID-19_US_County-
level_Summaries/tree/master/data (county-level lockdown orders). When a county issued its own lockdown order 
before the state-level lockdown order, we use its own lockdown order date as the implementation data. Otherwise, 
we use the state-level lockdown order date as the implementation date. 
7 See https://cps.ipums.org/cps-action/variables/EMPSTAT#description_section for more detailed information about 
this variable 
8 See https://cps.ipums.org/cps-action/variables/ABSENT#description_section for more detailed information about 
this variable 
9 See https://cps.ipums.org/cps-action/variables/ABSENT#description_section for more detailed information about 
this variable 
10 According BLS’ instructions (2020), “Workers who are temporarily or permanently absent from their jobs, but 
are not being paid, are not counted as employed, even if they are continuing to receive benefits.” However, there 
may be a minor misclassification issue due to misunderstanding. 
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jobs. Dingel and Neiman (2020) propose a teleworkability classification scheme based on 17 
heuristic indicators, such as whether workers in that occupation can spend most of their time 
walking or running, whether workers are at risk of injury. As long as one of these 17 criteria is 
satisfied, the work is labeled as “cannot be performed at home” (i.e., teleworkable). This 
measure has been used in several recent studies (e.g., Forsythe et al. 2020; Avdiu and Nayyar 
2020). Fourth, to examine whether and how the effect of teleworkability varies between 
automatable jobs and non-automatable jobs, we match each respondent’s occupation code with 
the occupation-based automatability measure proposed by Frey and Osborne (2017), which 
denotes the probability of a job being computerized or automated. If the probability of a job 
being automated is less than 0.5, we classify it as a non-automatable job; otherwise, it is 
classified as an automatable job. Fifth, we obtain the county-level broadband coverage data from 
FCC and match it with the CPS data based on the respondent’s county of residence. 
To build our panel data set, we group respondents based on their occupation characteristics 
and further aggregate the CPS individual-level data into the county-level. Specifically, to 
estimate the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience, within each county, we classify 
respondents into 2 groups (i.e., teleworkable and non-teleworkable) based on Dingel and Neiman 
(2020)’s teleworkability measure. We further calculate the group-specific averages in all the 
three employment measures weighted by the CPS survey weights for each county each month 
(e.g., Forsythe et al. 2020). In the same vein, to investigate the potential heterogeneous impacts 
of teleworkability across automatable and non-automatable jobs, we classify respondents into 4 
groups within each county: 1) non-teleworkable and automatable; 2) non-teleworkable and non-
automatable; 3) teleworkable and automatable; 4) teleworkable and non-automatable. Table 1 
shows the top 10 occupations classified by teleworkability and automatability based on the CPS 
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data. Additionally, to examine if the effect of teleworkability varies by gender, we classify 
respondents into 4 groups within each county according to their job teleworkability and genders: 
1) non-teleworkable female; 2) non-teleworkable male; 3) teleworkable female; 4) teleworkable 
male.   
Table 1. Top 10 Occupations by Teleworability and Automatability in the US  
 Non-Teleworkable Teleworkable 
Non-
Automatable 
1. Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 
(9130) 
2. Registered nurses (3255) 
3. First-Line supervisors of retail sales 
workers (4700) 
4. Cashiers (4720) 
5. Janitors and building cleaners (4220) 
6. Cooks (4020) 
7. Stockers and order fillers (9645) 
8. Nursing assistants (3603) 
9. Personal care aides (3602) 
10. Sales representatives, wholesale and 
manufacturing (4850) 
1. Managers, all other (440) 
2. Elementary and middle school teachers 
(2310) 
3. Software developers (1021) 
4. Chief executives (10) 
5. Teaching assistants (2545) 
6. Financial managers (120) 
7. First-Line supervisors of office and 
administrative support workers (5000) 
8. Lawyers (2100) 
9. Childcare workers (4600) 
10. First-Line supervisors of non-retail sales 
workers (4710) 
Automatable 1. Retail salespersons (4760) 
2. Customer service representatives (5240) 
3. Laborers and freight, stock, and material 
movers, hand (9620) 
4. Construction laborers (6260) 
5. Waiters and waitresses (4110) 
6. Maids and housekeeping cleaners (4230) 
7. Carpenters (6230) 
8. Receptionists and information clerks 
(5400) 
9. Landscaping and groundskeeping 
workers (4251) 
10. Miscellaneous agricultural workers 
(6050) 
1. Secretaries and administrative assistants, 
except legal, medical, and executive (5740) 
2. Accountants and auditors (800) 
3. Office clerks, general (5860) 
4. Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing 
clerks (5120) 
5. Property, real estate, and community 
association managers (410) 
6. Insurance sales agents (4810) 
7. Couriers and messengers (5510) 
8. Personal financial advisors (850) 
9. Paralegals and legal assistants (2145) 
10. Market research analysts and marketing 
specialists (735) 
Note: Occupation codes are in parentheses. 
 
To identify whether teleworkability improves workers’ resilience to the shock of COVID-
19, we leverage the staggered implementation of the stay-at-home order across counties to 
conduct the triple-difference (DDD) analysis with county-specific fixed effects (e.g., Chan and 
Chose 2014; Burtch et al. 2018). However, given that county-level lockdown orders had been 
implemented intensively in March or in the first week of April, it is infeasible to conduct the 
staggered DDD analysis when aggregating the implementation time into the monthly level. As 
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such, in the main analysis, we aggregate the implementation time into the weekly level and also 
impute the CPS group-specific monthly data into the weekly level. During the imputation 
process, we impute all employment measures for each week in a specific month with the monthly 
level averages.11 To assess the robustness of our analysis, we also conduct DID analysis at the 
county-month and DDD analysis at individual-month levels and find highly consistent results.  
In the county-week panel, since all counties lift the stay-at-home order within three months, 
we use 11 weeks (~3 months) after the stay-at-home order implementation as the post-treatment 
period window. We also include five weeks (with one baseline week) before the stay-at-home as 
the pre-treatment period window to examine if different occupation groups follow a parallel 
trend. We use the same analysis window for all our main analyses. The definitions of all 
variables and their statistics are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 2. Variable Description  
Variable 
Category 













Unemployed The group-specific share of the 
working-age population that were 





Layoff The group-specific share of the 
working-age population who were 





WorkAbsent The group-specific share of the 
working-age population who were 
temporarily absent due to reasons 
other than layoff (e.g., vacation, 
illness, labor dispute) 
Internet FCC County County Broadband The demeaned ratio of houses with 
fixed high-speed Internet coverage 
at the end of the year 2018, which 
is the latest measurement of 
broadband coverage 
Lockdown Oxford COVID-
19 GRT and 






Lockdown Whether it is after the 
implementation date of the county 
lockdown order 
 
11 There might be potential measurement errors in this imputed county monthly panel data since we use the monthly 
average to proxy the weekly average. However, to the best of our knowledge, these measurement errors should only 




Table 3. Summary Statistics of Variables  
Variable Name Level N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Unemployed County-Week  7,508 0.085 0.096 0.000 0.696 
Layoff County-Week  7,508 0.060 0.086 0.000 0.648 
WorkAbsent County-Week 7,508 0.108 0.111 0.000 0.648 
Broadband County 199 0 0.102 -0.683 0.277 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
Our baseline identification uses a triple-difference (DDD) design (Bertrand et al. 2004; 
Greenwood and Wattal 2017; He et al. 2020) with county-specific fixed effects to examine 
whether workers in teleworkable jobs are more resilient during the county lockdown period.12 
These lockdown orders act as the staggered shocks on the employment status, which allows us to 
estimate how teleworkability mitigates the negative effect of the lockdown order on workers’ 
employment. In our DDD setup, we estimate a within-group DD of the change in workers’ 
employment status before vs. after the implementation of the lockdown order. The DDD captures 
the change in workers’ employment status in the teleworkable group relative to the change in the 
non-teleworkable group. In other words, the non-teleworkable group helps us infer what would 
be the counterfactual of the teleworkable group during the post-treatment period. To examine 
when the effect of the lockdown order starts to emerge and how it evolves dynamically among 
workers in the teleworkable and non-teleworkable groups, we further a dynamic DDD by 
estimating the difference between the changes in both groups on a weekly basis. Our static DDD 
and dynamic DDD models are as follows: 
Emp_Statusijt =  β10 + β11 × Lockdownit + β12 × Telej + β13 × Lockdownit × Telej + αi +
εijt  (1) (Static DDD Specification) 
 
12 We use “stay-at-home” and “lockdown” interchangeably. 
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Emp_Statusijt =  β20 +  β21 × Iit +  β22 × Tele𝑗 +  β23 × Iit × Telej + αi +  τt + εijt (2) 
(Dynamic DDD Specification) 
where 𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the group-specific employment status measures of group 𝑗 for county 𝑖 
in week 𝑖, including 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐿𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
In the static DDD specification, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether county 
𝑖’s lockdown order is in effect at week 𝑡, representing the within-group static DD. 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑗 is a 
group dummy, denotes whether the observation belongs to the teleworkable group or not. 𝛼𝑖 and 
𝜏𝑡 represent the county-level fixed effects and month-week fixed effects. The county-level fixed 
effects control for differences in the economy across counties, while the month-week fixed effect 
takes into account the potential time trend. We cluster the error terms by the state to account for 
potential serial correlations within states (Bertrand et al. 2004). In the dynamic DDD 
specification, instead of including 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡 to capture a static DD, we add I𝑖𝑡, a vector of 
relative time dummies with respect to the implementation date of the county lockdown order, to 
estimate the week-by-week DDD between the teleworkable and non-teleworkable groups. 
 In our static and dynamic DDD specification, 𝛽11, 𝛽12, 𝛽13, and 𝛽22 are single coefficients; 
𝛽21 and 𝛽23 are vectors of coefficients. 𝛽11 and 𝛽21capture the impact of the lockdown order on 
workers’ employment status in the non-teleworkable group statically and dynamically. 𝛽12 and 
𝛽22capture the average difference in workers’ employment status between the teleworkable and 
non-teleworkable groups prior to the lockdown order. 𝛽13 and 𝛽23 capture the additional effect of 
the lockdown order on workers’ employment status in the teleworkable group relative to that in 
the non-teleworkable group statically and dynamically. We explicitly examine the exogenous 
implementation condition (i.e., Lockdownit and I𝑖𝑡)  based on the survival model in our 
robustness check section. Based on prior discussions, we expect that 𝛽11 and 𝛽21 are positive 
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since the stay-at-home order is expected to lead to an increase in the unemployment rate, work 
absence rate, and layoff rate. However, 𝛽13 and  𝛽23 are expected to be negative for the 
teleworkable group after the implementation of the stay-at-home order, indicating that 
teleworkability helps workers to be more resilient during the pandemic.  
To examine whether the effect of teleworkability varies by job automatability, we estimate 
the following static DDD and dynamic DDD models based on the four occupation groups 
introduced in Section 4, i.e., 1) non-teleworkable and automatable (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜); 2) non-
teleworkable and non-automatable (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜); 3) teleworkable and automatable 
(𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜); 4) teleworkable and non-automatable (𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜). Guided by our hypothesis, 
we use the non-teleworkable and automatable group as the baseline group, in which workers are 
expected to have the lowest resilience. Finally, we use similar model specifications to examine 
the potential heterogeneous effect of teleworkability across gender based on four groups: 1) non-
teleworkable female (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒); 2) non-teleworkable male (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒); 3) 
teleworkable female (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑒); 4) teleworkable male (𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒). For our interest, 
we interact teleworkability with gender. Table 4 summarizes our strategy to test each hypothesis. 
Table 4. Groups Related to Different Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Analysis All Groups Used in the Analysis 
H1a, Main effect of 
teleworkability 
Teleworkable vs. Non-Teleworkable 2 groups by teleworkability: NonTele, Tele 
H1b, Moderating 
effect of broadband 
Teleworkable vs. Non-Teleworkable 2 groups by teleworkability: NonTele, Tele  
H2, Moderating effect 
of automatability 
(Non-Teleworkable, Automatable) vs. 
the other three groups 
4 groups by teleworkability and automatability: 
NonTele_Auto, NonTele_NonAuto, Tele_Auto, 
Tele_NonAuto 
H3a, H3b, 
Moderating effect of 
gender 
(Teleworkable vs. Non-Teleworkable) 
X (Females or Males) 
4 groups by teleworkability and gender:  
NonTele_Female, NonTele_Male, Tele_Female, 
Tele_Male 
H3c, Moderating 
effect of childcare for 
females 
(Teleworkable vs. Non-Teleworkable) 
X (withChild vs. withoutChild) 
4 groups by teleworkability and withChild within 





 6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Model-free Evidence 
Figure 2 visualizes the impact of the lockdown order on the three measures of employment status 
in the non-teleworkable and teleworkable groups, respectively. We see that workers in both 
groups exhibit parallel trends before the implementation of the lockdown order, but diverge 
significantly after the implementation of the lockdown order. Before the implementation of the 
lockdown order, teleworkable workers tend to have a lower unemployment rate, work absence 
rate, and layoff rate. We also add a ‘counterfactual group’, which is equal to the teleworkable 
group when the relative time is smaller than or equal to 𝑇 − 1 (i.e., the baseline week), and equal 
to the non-teleworkable group plus the two group difference at the baseline week when the 
relative time is greater than 𝑇 − 1. The results indicate that the increase in the unemployment 
rate, work absence rate, layoff rate is smaller in the teleworkable group than that in the non-
teleworkable group after the implementation of the lockdown order. This model-free evidence 






Figure 2. Time-series Trends in Worker’s Resilience Based on Raw Data 
6.2 Main Effect of Teleworkability 
We first examine the effect of teleworkability on workers’ employment status using static DDD 
by comparing the teleworkable group with the non-teleworkable group. Workers’ employment 
status is measured by three variables: unemployment rate (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑), work absence rate 
(𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡), and layoff rate (𝐿𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓). As Table 5 shows, teleworkable workers are less 
likely to be unemployed, absent from work, or laid off during the lockdown period. Specifically, 
teleworkability can offset the increase in the unemployment rate due to the lockdown order by 
51.5%, that in work absence rate by 54.9%, and that in layoff rate by 51.7%. The magnitude of  
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑗 is similar across different specifications, including state-week fixed effects 
(Columns 2, 4, and 6), suggesting the measures are quite robust. These results provide 
remarkable evidence that teleworkability significantly reduces workers’ unemployment, work 
absence, and layoff. This suggests that teleworkability helps improve workers’ resilience to 
workplace disruption, as captured by the lockdown order (H1a is supported). 
Table 5. Impact of the Lockdown Order on Employment Status by Teleworkability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡 Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡 
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Lockdown𝑖𝑡 0.114*** 0.0148* 0.146*** 0.0296* 0.110*** 0.00935* 
 (0.00910) (0.00746) (0.00964) (0.0159) (0.00811) (0.00524) 
Telej -0.0244*** -0.0244*** -0.0153*** -0.0153*** -0.0120*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00540) (0.00540) (0.00274) (0.00274) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Telej -0.0587*** -0.0587*** -0.0801*** -0.0801*** -0.0569*** -0.0570*** 
 (0.00890) (0.00891) (0.00874) (0.00874) (0.00780) (0.00781) 
Observations 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 7,508 
R-squared 0.518 0.650 0.514 0.666 0.505 0.661 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We further leverage the dynamic DDD specification to examine how teleworkability 
influences workers’ employment status dynamically. Table 6 and Figure 3 reveal several worth 
noting findings. First, none of the models exhibit a statistically significant pre-treatment trend, 
suggesting that the DID based identification strategy is a valid empirical strategy in our setting. 
Second, we find that teleworkability can help to alleviate the notable positive effect of the 
lockdown order on the unemployment rate, work absence rate, and layoff rate right after its 
implementation. Third, the effect of teleworkability is relatively stable and positive during the 
eleven-week lockdown period.   
Table 6. Dynamic DDD on Employment Status by Teleworkability 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
T-5 0.0139 0.0239 0.0121 
 (0.0177) (0.0255) (0.0165) 
T-4 0.0104 0.0178 0.0102 
 (0.0134) (0.0205) (0.0130) 
T-3 0.00952 0.0136 0.00802 
 (0.00828) (0.0134) (0.00814) 
T-2 0.00437 0.00612 0.00351 
 (0.00403) (0.00663) (0.00401) 
T+0 -0.00111 -0.000886 -0.000450 
 (0.00634) (0.00848) (0.00603) 
T+1 0.0212* 0.0317* 0.0217** 
 (0.0107) (0.0157) (0.0102) 
T+2 0.0427*** 0.0672*** 0.0396*** 
 (0.00810) (0.00979) (0.00735) 
T+3 0.0550*** 0.0834*** 0.0476*** 
 (0.00945) (0.0117) (0.00805) 
T+4 0.0661*** 0.0970*** 0.0543*** 
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 (0.0113) (0.0154) (0.00924) 
T+5 0.0784*** 0.109*** 0.0626*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0165) (0.0104) 
T+6 0.0958*** 0.120*** 0.0728*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0171) (0.0102) 
T+7 0.109*** 0.135*** 0.0833*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0200) (0.0119) 
T+8 0.122*** 0.148*** 0.0931*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0233) (0.0142) 
T+9 0.134*** 0.158*** 0.101*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0272) (0.0175) 
T+10 0.138*** 0.152*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0218) (0.0283) (0.0179) 
Telej -0.0294*** -0.0196*** -0.0160*** 
 (0.00442) (0.00673) (0.00361) 
T − 5 × Telej 0.0118** 0.00967 0.0101*** 
 (0.00470) (0.00623) (0.00248) 
T − 4 × Telej 0.0105** 0.00895** 0.00689** 
 (0.00444) (0.00340) (0.00286) 
T − 3 × Telej 0.00111 0.00178 0.00143 
 (0.000902) (0.00157) (0.00122) 
T − 2 × Telej 0.00111 0.00178 0.00143 
 (0.000902) (0.00157) (0.00122) 
T + 0 × Telej -0.0112** -0.0181** -0.0116** 
 (0.00551) (0.00701) (0.00508) 
T + 1 × Telej -0.0442*** -0.0722*** -0.0466*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0202) (0.0131) 
T + 2 × Telej -0.0590*** -0.103*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0114) 
T + 3 × Telej -0.0588*** -0.103*** -0.0643*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0114) 
T + 4 × Telej -0.0589*** -0.0962*** -0.0637*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0114) 
T + 5 × Telej -0.0588*** -0.0874*** -0.0622*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
T + 6 × Telej -0.0659*** -0.0828*** -0.0607*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0100) (0.00909) 
T + 7 × Telej -0.0659*** -0.0828*** -0.0607*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0100) (0.00909) 
T + 8 × Telej -0.0651*** -0.0813*** -0.0596*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0102) (0.00913) 
T + 9 × Telej -0.0603*** -0.0713*** -0.0542*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.00847) 
T + 10 × Telej -0.0454*** -0.0392*** -0.0375*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.00652) 
Observations 7,508 7,508 7,508 
R-squared 0.530 0.569 0.547 
Number of County 235 235 235 
County FE YES YES YES 
Week FE YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; T-X means X weeks prior to 
the implementation of stay-at-home order in county 𝑖, and T+X means X weeks since the implementation of stay-at-
home order in county 𝑖. 
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Note: All figures are plotted based on Table 6. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
6.3 Broadband Coverage 
We further examine the heterogeneous effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience for 
different counties, which differs in terms of high-speed Internet coverage (i.e., broadband 
coverage). Our results in Table 7 indicate that a 1% increase in the broadband coverage rate 
amplifies the effect of teleworkability in reducing the unemployment rate by 3.4%, and the layoff 
rate by 1.7%. Even though the moderating effect of broadband coverage on work absence rate is 
insignificant, the sign of the DDD estimator is consistent with our hypothesis. Overall, we find 
that the positive effect of teleworkability on workers' resilience is stronger in areas with higher 
high-speed Internet coverage. Therefore, H1b is supported. 
Table 7. Impact of the Lockdown Order by Teleworkability and Broadband Coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑖𝑡  0.116*** 0.0141 0.146*** 0.0340*** 0.110*** 0.00871 
 (0.00969) (0.00858) (0.00998) (0.0108) (0.00896) (0.00754) 
Telej -0.0252*** -0.0252*** -0.0132** -0.0132** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** 
 (0.00356) (0.00356) (0.00643) (0.00643) (0.00320) (0.00320) 
Lockdownit × Telej -0.0580*** -0.0581*** -0.0782*** -0.0783*** -0.0547*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.00979) (0.00980) (0.00978) (0.00979) (0.00911) (0.00912) 
Lockdownit × Broadbandi 0.0520 0.0914 -0.0798 -0.128* -0.0289 -0.00358 
 (0.0706) (0.0560) (0.0938) (0.0739) (0.0657) (0.0471) 
Telej × Broadbandi 0.132*** 0.132*** -0.0603 -0.0603 0.0457 0.0457 
 (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0293) (0.0293) 
Lockdownit × Telej × Broadbandi -0.196*** -0.196*** -0.0214 -0.0210 -0.0935* -0.0932* 
 (0.0541) (0.0541) (0.0649) (0.0649) (0.0469) (0.0469) 
Observations 6,356 6,356 6,356 6,356 6,356 6,356 
R-squared 0.522 0.657 0.514 0.670 0.508 0.668 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
6.4 Automatability 
We now investigate whether the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience varies by the job 
automatability. In the analysis, we use the non-teleworkable automatable group as our baseline. 
Table 8 and Figure 4 reveal several interesting findings. For one thing, as shown in Figure 4, 
among non-teleworkable workers, those in non-automatable jobs tend to have a lower 
unemployment rate, a lower work absence rate, and a lower layoff rate than those in automatable 
jobs. This suggests that, without teleworkability, those workers whose jobs are at risk of being 
automated are hit harder by the lockdown order. Specifically, according to Table 8, the 
infeasibility of automation (i.e., non-automatability) can mitigate the effects of lockdown orders 
on the unemployment rate by 22.3%, that on the work absence rate by 26.7%, and that on the 
layoff rate by 30.3%. For another, among teleworkable workers, regardless of job automatability, 
they all have a similar low unemployment rate, work absence rate, and layoff rate.  
To test H2, we further examine the potential effect of job automatability on the relationship 
between teleworkability and worker resilience. Results show that, for jobs that face a high threat 
of automation, teleworkability can effectively reduce the unemployment rate compared to jobs 
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that are not teleworkable (-.077). For jobs that are not automatable, the effect of teleworkability 
is also notable but is smaller (-0.47) than that on automatable jobs. These results seem to suggest 
that teleworkability can help workers mitigate the threat of automation since firms have effective 
alternatives to maintain work continuity during crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and 
therefore are less likely to resort to automation as the solution. On the other hand, for jobs that 
are not automatable, firms have to maintain their labor force if they are still planning to be in 
business, therefore the effect of teleworkability is smaller for non-automatable jobs. Specifically, 
the effect of teleworkability for workers in automatable jobs is 1.64 times stronger than that for 
those in non-automatable jobs in reducing the unemployment rate (-.077 vs.-.047,13 t=-3.56, 
p<.001), is 2.05 times stronger in reducing work absence (-.121 vs.-.059,14  t=-5.20, p<.001), 
and is 2.13 times stronger in lowering layoff rate (-.085 vs.-.040,15 t=-6.54, p<.001). The 
magnitudes of the interactions between the Lockdown𝑖𝑡 dummy and all three group dummies 
(i.e., NonTele_NonAutoj, Tele_Autoj, and Tele_NonAutoj) are similar across specifications, 
including state-week fixed effects (Columns 2, 4, and 6). Overall, we find that the positive effect 
of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is stronger for workers whose jobs are automatable, 
which lends support to H2.  
Table 8. Impact of the Lockdown Order by Teleworkability and Automatability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele_Auto 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡 Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Lockdownit 0.132*** 0.0332*** 0.175*** 0.0582*** 0.135*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0107) (0.0144) (0.0169) (0.0118) (0.00710) 
NonTele_NonAutoj -0.0375*** -0.0375*** -0.0157*** -0.0157*** -0.0123*** -0.0123*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00440) (0.00541) (0.00541) (0.00237) (0.00237) 
Tele_Autoj -0.0456*** -0.0456*** -0.0326*** -0.0326*** -0.0212*** -0.0211*** 
 (0.00547) (0.00544) (0.00587) (0.00588) (0.00403) (0.00405) 
Tele_NonAutoj -0.0481*** -0.0481*** -0.0203** -0.0203** -0.0186*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00917) (0.00917) (0.00415) (0.00415) 
 
13 -0.0763- (-0.0295) = -0.047 
14 -0.1060 - (-0.0467) = -0.059 
15 -0.0809 - (-0.0409) = -0.040 
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Lockdownit × NonTele_NonAutoj -0.0295*** -0.0295*** -0.0467*** -0.0467*** -0.0409*** -0.0409*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.00833) (0.00833) 
Lockdownit × Tele_Autoj -0.0771*** -0.0774*** -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.0849*** -0.0852*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0103) (0.0104) 
Lockdownit × Tele_NonAutoj -0.0763*** -0.0763*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.0809*** -0.0809*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
Observations 14,713 14,713 14,713 14,713 14,713 14,713 
R-squared 0.406 0.498 0.419 0.531 0.407 0.522 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 






Figure 4. Marginal Effect of the Lockdown Order by Teleworkability and Automatability 
Notes: All figures are plotted based on Table 8. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
6.5 Gender 
To investigate whether the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience varies across gender, 
we group respondents based on their job teleworkability and genders and further interact job 
teleworkability with gender.  As Table 9 and Figure 5 show, the positive effect of teleworkability 
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on workers’ resilience seems to be slightly stronger for females than for their male counterparts 
in the same county. Specifically, the effect of teleworkability for females is 1.18 times stronger 
than that for males in reducing the unemployment rate (-.06916 vs. -.059, t = -1.06, p = .292), is 
1.18 times stronger in reducing work absence rate (-.09217 vs. -.078, t = -1.13, p = .265), and is 
1.22 times stronger in reducing layoff rate (-.06718 vs. -.055, t = -1.39, p = .172). However, all 
the differences are not statistically significant. A likely explanation for this finding is that 
females tend to spend more time in childcare than males19 and the school closure during the 
lockdown period may disproportionately increase the childcare constraint for females with kids 
than their male counterparts.20 To rule out the effect of the potential change in childcare 
constraint during the lockdown period, we further examine whether the positive effect of 
teleworkability on workers’ resilience is stronger for females than males under no childcare 
constraint. 
 
Table 9. Impact of the Lockdown Order by Teleworkability and Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑖𝑡  0.0995*** -0.00821 0.130*** 0.0169 0.0957*** -0.00866 
 (0.00677) (0.00954) (0.0126) (0.0246) (0.00904) (0.00521) 
Tele𝑗 -0.0282*** -0.0282*** -0.0185** -0.0184** -0.0148*** -0.0148*** 
 (0.00472) (0.00483) (0.00739) (0.00750) (0.00257) (0.00256) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗  -0.0587*** -0.0588*** -0.0778*** -0.0781*** -0.0554*** -0.0555*** 
 (0.00759) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.00743) (0.00743) 
Female𝑗 -0.00685* -0.00684* 0.00754 0.00766 -0.00103 -0.000999 
 (0.00414) (0.00357) (0.00518) (0.00519) (0.00235) (0.00234) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Female𝑗  0.0335*** 0.0335*** 0.0389*** 0.0387*** 0.0331*** 0.0331*** 
 (0.00747) (0.00757) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00623) (0.00622) 
Tele𝑗 × Female𝑗 0.00774 0.00772 0.00509 0.00485 0.00434 0.00432 
 
16 -0.0587 + (-0.0103) = -0.0690  
17 -0.0778 + (-0.0146) = -0.0924 
18 -0.0555 + (-0.0115) = -0.0670 
19 According to American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 2019, on average, females spend 0.49 hours per day on 
childcare while males spend 0.23 hours per day. The gender difference in time on housework is even larger. Females 
spend 0.78 hours per day on housework while males only spend 0.27 hours per day (source: 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.t01.htm). 




 (0.00646) (0.00712) (0.00690) (0.00706) (0.00294) (0.00294) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗 × Female𝑗  -0.0103 -0.0102 -0.0146 -0.0143 -0.0116 -0.0115 
 (0.00976) (0.0104) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.00835) (0.00835) 
Observations 17,462 17,462 17,462 17,462 17,462 17,462 
R-squared 0.375 0.465 0.391 0.497 0.392 0.503 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 





Figure 5. Marginal Effect of the Lockdown Order by Teleworkability and Gender 
Notes: All figures are plotted based on Table 9. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.   
 
To examine whether the teleworkability helps the female workers more than their male 
counterparts when there is no childcare constraint, we rerun the analysis separately for those 
workers with and without kid(s). For those workers without childcare constraint, the effect of 
teleworkability for females is 1.5 times stronger than that for males in reducing the 
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unemployment rate (-.07821 vs. - .052, t = -2.48, p = 0.018), is 1.36 times stronger in reducing 
work absence rate (-.09822 vs. -.072, t = -1.80, p = -0.080), and is 1.35 times stronger in reducing 
layoff rate (-.07423 vs. -.055, t = -1.83, p = -0.075). In contrast, for those with childcare 
constraint, the effect of teleworkability for female workers is not significantly stronger than that 
of males in reducing unemployment rate (-.06324 vs. - .067, t = -.28, p =.783), or in reducing 
work absence rate (-.09225 vs. -.084, t = -.56, p<.579), or in reducing layoff rate (-.06426 vs. 
-.055, t = -.72, p = .475). Taken together, the positive effect of teleworkability is stronger for 
females than males only when they have no childcare constraints. Therefore, our H3a is partially 
supported and H3b is not supported. 
Table 10. Split-sample Analysis of Impact of the Lockdown Order on Employment Status 
by Teleworkability and Gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample A Subsample of Workers without Child 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑖𝑡  0.106*** -0.0195** 0.140*** 0.00949 0.105*** -0.0109* 
 (0.0109) (0.00794) (0.0113) (0.0280) (0.00844) (0.00575) 
Female𝑗 -0.0131*** -0.0132*** 0.00471 0.00494 -0.00271 -0.00276 
 (0.00399) (0.00400) (0.00720) (0.00726) (0.00341) (0.00338) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Female𝑗 0.0422*** 0.0422*** 0.0332*** 0.0329*** 0.0335*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.00749) (0.00748) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.00574) (0.00571) 
Tele𝑗 -0.0353*** -0.0351*** -0.0154* -0.0146* -0.0147*** -0.0145*** 
 (0.00479) (0.00481) (0.00828) (0.00857) (0.00308) (0.00302) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗  -0.0523*** -0.0524*** -0.0723*** -0.0731*** -0.0549*** -0.0550*** 
 (0.00972) (0.00974) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.00727) (0.00727) 
Tele𝑗 × Female𝑗 0.0119 0.0118 0.00273 0.00188 0.00367 0.00356 
 (0.00710) (0.00708) (0.00768) (0.00790) (0.00324) (0.00315) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗 × Female𝑗 -0.0261** -0.0262** -0.0259* -0.0252* -0.0189* -0.0188* 
 (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Observations 16,713 16,713 16,713 16,713 16,713 16,713 
R-squared 0.317 0.393 0.316 0.408 0.317 0.406 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 
21 -0.0523 + (-0.0261) = -0.0784 
22 -0.0723 + (-0.0259) = -0.0982 
23 -0.0549 + (-0.0189) = -0.0738 
24 -0.0669 + 0.0044 = -0.0625 
25 -0.0838 + (-0.0083) = -0.0921 
26 -0.0551+ (-0.0092) = -0.0643 
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Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 10 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample A Subsample of Workers with Child 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑖𝑡  0.0967*** 0.00888 0.126*** 0.0287* 0.0882*** -0.00335 
 (0.0122) (0.0284) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0123) (0.0102) 
Female𝑗 0.00598 0.00608 0.0120 0.0121* 0.000209 0.000246 
 (0.00655) (0.00652) (0.00721) (0.00717) (0.00399) (0.00397) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Female𝑗  0.0224** 0.0224** 0.0433*** 0.0432*** 0.0336*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.00968) (0.00967) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0111) (0.0111) 
Tele𝑗  -0.0133 -0.0133 -0.0213*** -0.0210*** -0.0159*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.00920) (0.00930) (0.00749) (0.00768) (0.00365) (0.00367) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗  -0.0669*** -0.0671*** -0.0838*** -0.0843*** -0.0551*** -0.0552*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
Tele𝑗 × Female𝑗 -2.41e-05 -0.000288 0.00778 0.00727 0.00666 0.00651 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.00574) (0.00571) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗 × Female𝑗  0.00440 0.00467 -0.00833 -0.00780 -0.00922 -0.00910 
 (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Observations 16,485 16,485 16,485 16,485 16,485 16,485 
R-squared 0.269 0.329 0.323 0.400 0.291 0.371 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
To formally test if the childcare constraint reduces the positive effect of teleworkability in 
females’ resilience, we narrow down our analysis to the female subsample and interact 
teleworkability with whether they have kid(s). The results in Table 11 suggests that females 
without kids can benefit more from teleworkability. Specifically, the effect of teleworkability for 
females without kids is 1.26 times stronger than that of females with kid(s) in reducing 
unemployment rate (-.079 vs. -.063,27 t = -1.76, p < 0.1), is 1.06 times stronger in reducing work 
absence rate (-.098 vs. -.092,28 t = .34, p =.739 ), and is 1.14 times stronger in reducing layoff 
rate (-.073 vs. -.064,29 t = -1.10, p =.277). On the whole, the positive effect of teleworkability is 
 
27 -0.0785 + 0.0160 = -0.0625 
28 -0.0980 + 0.0056 = -0.0924 
29 -0.0730 + 0.0086 = -0.0644 
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weaker for females with childcare constraints than those without, suggesting that our H3c is 
supported. 
Table 11. Impact of the Lockdown Order on Employment Status 
by Teleworkability and Childcare Constraint Among Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Sample A Subsample of Female Workers 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑖𝑡  0.148*** 0.0291*** 0.173*** 0.0626*** 0.138*** 0.0271*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00712) (0.0108) (0.00920) (0.00819) (0.00518) 
Tele𝑗 -0.0234*** -0.0232*** -0.0125* -0.0125* -0.0111*** -0.0110*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00690) (0.00660) (0.00660) (0.00313) (0.00313) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗  -0.0785*** -0.0789*** -0.0980*** -0.0983*** -0.0730*** -0.0734*** 
 (0.00946) (0.00953) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.00886) (0.00896) 
withChild𝑗 -0.00615 -0.00609 0.00748 0.00745 0.000124 0.000212 
 (0.00618) (0.00619) (0.00905) (0.00909) (0.00420) (0.00420) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × withChild𝑗 -0.0289*** -0.0290*** -0.00370 -0.00356 -0.0156* -0.0157* 
 (0.00588) (0.00588) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.00781) (0.00784) 
Tele𝑗 × withChild𝑗 0.0101 0.00973 -0.00122 -0.00132 0.00143 0.00108 
 (0.00917) (0.00914) (0.00961) (0.00962) (0.00509) (0.00503) 
Lockdown𝑖𝑡 × Tele𝑗
× withChild𝑗 
0.0160* 0.0163* 0.00562 0.00554 0.00864 0.00885 
 (0.00908) (0.00912) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.00783) (0.00790) 
Observations 16,764 16,764 16,764 16,764 16,764 16,764 
R-squared 0.287 0.361 0.310 0.394 0.300 0.387 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
7.1 Alternative Levels of Analysis 
To assess the robustness of our findings, we rerun our analysis at the county-month level. 
However, given that county-level lockdown orders had been implemented intensively in March 
or in the first week of April, it is infeasible to conduct the staggered DDD analysis when 
aggregating the implementation time into the monthly level. Instead, we use the following DID 
model to estimate the effect of teleworkability: 
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𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽30 +  𝛽31 × 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽32 × 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽33 × 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 × 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼𝑖 +
 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (3) 
where 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡 indicates whether the lockdown order is in place at month t and 𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑗 
indicates whether group j is the treatment group (e.g., the teleworkable group) or the control 
group. When there are more than two groups for comparison, the baseline group is considered as 
the control group. Since most counties announced their lockdown orders in March or the first 
week of April, we consider March as the stay-at-home order implementation month for all 
counties. We find highly consistent results. First, as results summarized in Table 12, 
teleworkability can offset the increase in unemployment rate due to the lockdown order by 
47.9%, that in work absence rate by 34.0%, and that in layoff rate by 47.8%. Second, as shown 
in Table 13, a 1% increase in the broadband coverage rate amplifies the effect of teleworkability 
in reducing the unemployment rate by 2.32%, the layoff rate by 4.84%, and the layoff rate by 
2.29%. Therefore, both H1a and H1b are supported by the count-month level analysis. 
Table 12. The Impact of Lockdown Order by Teleworkability (County-Month Analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑡  0.0873***  0.105***  0.0873***  
 (0.00810)  (0.00563)  (0.00810)  
Telej -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.00854*** -0.00852*** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** 
 (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00372) (0.00372) 
Lockdownt × Telej -0.0418*** -0.0418*** -0.0357*** -0.0357*** -0.0418*** -0.0418*** 
 (0.00669) (0.00669) (0.00407) (0.00408) (0.00669) (0.00669) 
Observations 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 4,225 
R-squared 0.376 0.556 0.318 0.562 0.376 0.556 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Month FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table 13. The Impact of Lockdown Order by Teleworkability and Broadband 
 (County-Month Analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Lockdown𝑡  0.0882***  0.105***  0.0757***  
 (0.00755)  (0.00591)  (0.00488)  
Telej -0.0164*** -0.0164*** -0.00928*** -0.00921*** -0.00635*** -0.00634*** 
 (0.00303) (0.00303) (0.00244) (0.00244) (0.00195) (0.00195) 
Lockdown𝑡 × Telej -0.0416*** -0.0416*** -0.0320*** -0.0320*** -0.0334*** -0.0334*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00618) (0.00470) (0.00470) (0.00392) (0.00392) 
Lockdown𝑡 × Broadbandi 0.0261 0.0262 -0.0209 -0.0314 -0.00177 0.00882 
 (0.0511) (0.0393) (0.0581) (0.0515) (0.0393) (0.0263) 
Telej × Broadbandi 0.0389 0.0387 0.0500* 0.0486* 0.0321 0.0319 
 (0.0340) (0.0341) (0.0274) (0.0272) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
Lockdownt × Telej
× Broadbandi 
-0.0967** -0.0965** -0.155*** -0.154*** -0.0732*** -0.0728*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0463) (0.0461) (0.0260) (0.0259) 
Observations 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 3,577 
R-squared 0.370 0.557 0.321 0.569 0.319 0.588 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Month FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We further investigate whether the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience varies by 
job automatability with our county monthly panel data. The results are summarized in Table 14. 
Consistently, we find that the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is stronger 
for workers whose jobs are automatable, which lends support to H2. Further, we examine 
whether the potential heterogeneous effect of teleworkability varies across gender with our 
county monthly panel data. Consistently, we find that non-teleworkable females are hit harder by 
the lockdown order. Additionally, the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is 
i) stronger, though not significant, for females without kids than their male counterparts; ii) 
significantly weaker for females with kids than their male counterparts. Due to the page limit, 
detailed results regarding the gender difference are omitted. In short, all the results are 
qualitatively consistent with our main analysis. 
Table 14. The Impact of Lockdown Order on by Teleworkability and Automatability 
(County-Month Analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele_Auto 
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Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡 Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Lockdown𝑡 0.107***  0.123***  0.0942***  
 (0.0117)  (0.00926)  (0.00776)  
NonTele_NonAutoj -0.0221*** -0.0221*** -0.00867** -0.00866** -0.00691*** -0.00691*** 
 (0.00421) (0.00422) (0.00357) (0.00357) (0.00238) (0.00238) 
Tele_Autoj -0.0246*** -0.0245*** -0.0144*** -0.0143*** -0.00907*** -0.00901*** 
 (0.00600) (0.00600) (0.00509) (0.00510) (0.00249) (0.00248) 
Tele_NonAutoj -0.0317*** -0.0316*** -0.0135*** -0.0135*** -0.00990*** -0.00990*** 
 (0.00379) (0.00379) (0.00376) (0.00376) (0.00287) (0.00286) 
Lockdownt × NonTele_NonAutoj -0.0312*** -0.0312*** -0.0310*** -0.0310*** -0.0294*** -0.0295*** 
 (0.00733) (0.00733) (0.00680) (0.00680) (0.00515) (0.00515) 
Lockdownt × Tele_Autoj -0.0651*** -0.0653*** -0.0799*** -0.0799*** -0.0609*** -0.0610*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.00927) (0.00934) (0.00649) (0.00656) 
Lockdownt × Tele_NonAutoj -0.0605*** -0.0606*** -0.0458*** -0.0458*** -0.0517*** -0.0517*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.00721) (0.00722) (0.00690) (0.00691) 
Observations 8,290 8,290 8,290 8,290 8,290 8,290 
R-squared 0.284 0.402 0.255 0.424 0.255 0.438 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Month FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
7.2 Alternative Measure of Treatment 
In our main analysis, we leverage the staggered implementation of the stay-at-home order to 
identify the impact of teleworkability under the stay-at-home order. To further increase the 
generalizability of our study, we further exploit the variation in case rate over time across 
counties to identify the impact of teleworkability on workers’ resilience to the pandemic-induced 
labor market disruptions. We argue that the case rate is a strong proxy of the risk of virus 
transmission in local areas, which is expected to affect workers’ perceived uncertainty, fear, and 
thus behaviors, while companies are likely to respond voluntarily. For example, many companies 
close offices voluntarily even before the state-lockdown order in response to the serious threat of 
the virus. Specifically, we use the lagged cate rate to measure the severity of the pandemic to 
rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by reverse causality. In this analysis, we use 
the observation window from January 2020 to September 2020 since the impact of the case rate 
is lasting.  
As Table 15 shows, workers in teleworkable jobs are less likely to be unemployed, absent 
from work, or laid off than those in non-teleworkable jobs as the case rate increases, which is a 
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consistent result with our stay-at-home order analysis. Specifically, teleworkability can offset the 
increase in the unemployment rate due to the pandemic by 46.0%, that in work absence rate by 
30.9%, and that in layoff rate by 47.1%. Second, as shown in Table 16, a 1% increase in the 
broadband coverage rate amplifies the effect of teleworkability in reducing the unemployment 
rate by 5.6%, the work absence rate by 5.1%, and the layoff rate by 3.7%. Therefore, consistent 
with our county-week level analysis, both H1a and H1b are supported. 
Table 15. The Impact of Case Rate by Teleworkability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡  WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡  Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡  
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 0.0158*** 0.0130*** 0.0164*** 0.0173*** 0.0132*** 0.0104*** 
 (0.00145) (0.00319) (0.00132) (0.00422) (0.00110) (0.00261) 
Telej -0.0289*** -0.0289*** -0.0260*** -0.0260*** -0.0163*** -0.0163*** 
 (0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00385) (0.00385) (0.00229) (0.00229) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 × Telej -0.00690*** -0.00690*** -0.00506*** -0.00506*** -0.00622*** -0.00622*** 
 (0.00114) (0.00114) (0.00110) (0.00110) (0.000770) (0.000770) 
Observations 13,142 13,142 13,142 13,142 13,142 13,142 
R-squared 0.465 0.591 0.369 0.564 0.391 0.593 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 16.The Impact of Case Rate by Teleworkability and Broadband Coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡 Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 0.0160*** 0.0130*** 0.0165*** 0.0179*** 0.0132*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.00140) (0.00346) (0.00147) (0.00570) (0.00109) (0.00272) 
Telej -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0256*** -0.0256*** -0.0169*** -0.0169*** 
 (0.00300) (0.00300) (0.00471) (0.00471) (0.00220) (0.00220) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 × Telej -0.00670*** -0.00670*** -0.00456*** -0.00456*** -0.00574*** -0.00575*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.000807) (0.000807) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 × Broadbandi 0.0109 0.0111 -0.00357 -0.0106 0.00171 0.00250 
 (0.00980) (0.00808) (0.0135) (0.0123) (0.00952) (0.00686) 
Telej × Broadbandi 0.116*** 0.116*** -0.00534 -0.00519 0.0573* 0.0574* 
 (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0292) (0.0293) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 × Telej
× Broadbandi 
-0.0374*** -0.0374*** -0.0233* -0.0233* -0.0213* -0.0212* 
 (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0106) (0.0106) 
Observations 11,126 11,126 11,126 11,126 11,126 11,126 
R-squared 0.461 0.597 0.371 0.572 0.390 0.605 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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We further investigate whether the effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience varies by 
job automatability. The results are summarized in Table 17, which are consistent with our main 
analysis. Moreover, we find that non-teleworkable females are hit harder by the lockdown order. 
Teleworkability benefits females without kids more, though not significant, than their male 
counterparts. In contrast, teleworkability significantly benefits males with kids more than their 
female counterparts, which may be due to the disproportionate increase in childcare constraints 
on females. Due to the page limit, detailed results regarding the gender difference are omitted. 
Overall, all the results are qualitatively consistent with our analysis based on the staggered stay-
at-home order. 
Table 17. The Impact of Case Rate by Teleworkability and Automatability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline Group NonTele_ Auto 
Dep. Var. Unemployed𝑖𝑗𝑡 WorkAbsent𝑖𝑗𝑡 Layoff𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Ln(CaseRate1)it−1 0.0186*** 0.0169*** 0.0194*** 0.0221*** 0.0162*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.00295) (0.00392) (0.00275) (0.00406) (0.00234) (0.00304) 
NonTele_NonAutoj -0.0351*** -0.0351*** -0.0194** -0.0194** -0.0157*** -0.0157*** 
 (0.00595) (0.00595) (0.00775) (0.00773) (0.00507) (0.00507) 
Tele_Autoj -0.0513*** -0.0510*** -0.0425*** -0.0421*** -0.0284*** -0.0282*** 
 (0.00592) (0.00590) (0.00971) (0.00974) (0.00554) (0.00555) 
Tele_NonAutoj -0.0498*** -0.0499*** -0.0337*** -0.0338*** -0.0243*** -0.0243*** 
 (0.00750) (0.00749) (0.00769) (0.00767) (0.00506) (0.00505) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1
× NonTele_NonAutoj 
-0.00449* -0.00450* -0.00498* -0.00497* -0.00493** -0.00493** 
 (0.00254) (0.00254) (0.00246) (0.00246) (0.00215) (0.00215) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 × Tele_Autoj -0.00909*** -0.00917*** -0.0129*** -0.0130*** -0.00978*** -0.00986*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00232) (0.00282) (0.00283) (0.00206) (0.00207) 
Ln(CaseRate)it−1 × Tele_NonAutoj -0.0100*** -0.0100*** -0.00691*** -0.00691*** -0.00907*** -0.00908*** 
 (0.00289) (0.00289) (0.00249) (0.00249) (0.00212) (0.00212) 
Observations 25,688 25,688 25,688 25,688 25,688 25,688 
R-squared 0.350 0.434 0.297 0.439 0.307 0.451 
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State-Week FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the state level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
7.3 Entry Exogeneity 
A potential concern regarding the staggered design DID is that the entry of the stay-at-home 
order into a county may be endogenous and related to an unobserved trend in the labor market. 
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Although we expect that the implementation decision largely depends on the progress of the 
pandemic and is likely to be exogenous, below we conduct a robustness check to systematically 
assess the possibility of the endogenous entry of the stay-at-home order. To this end, we employ 
a Weibull hazard model with the expected time for county 𝑖 to implement the stay-at-home order 
as the dependent variable (Beck et al. 2010). Results reported in Table 18 suggests that the 
coefficients of the lagged terms regarding employment status can not significantly predict the 
implementation time. These results imply that the implementation of stay-at-home order is not 
driven by the employment status.  
Table 18.  Survival Model Predicting Stay-at-home Oder Implementation at Counties 
 (1) 










County FE YES 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
7.4 Counterfactual Estimation 
To further address the concern about omitted variable bias, we use the fixed effects 
counterfactual estimator to predict the counterfactual and then calculate the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) based on the calculated counterfactual. 30 As suggested by Liu et al. 
(2020), the fixed effects counterfactual estimator can provide more reliable estimates of 
treatment effects than two-way fixed effect models, especially when treatment effects may be 
heterogeneous and affected by unobserved time-varying confounders. Results are plotted in 
 
30  We use the FECT command in STATA to estimate our counterfactual estimators with time-series cross-section 
employment status data. 
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Figure 6. We find that there is no significant pre-treatment trend in both the teleworkable group 
and the non-teleworkable group. However, there is a significant increase in the unemployment 
rate, work absence rate, and layoff rate in both groups during the lockdown period. This suggests 
that the observed change in employment status is driven by the exogenous implementation of the 
lockdown order. Further, the increases in the unemployment rate, work absence rate, and layoff 
rate are around two times higher for non-teleworkable workers than for teleworkable workers, 






Figure 6.  Average Treatment Effect Based on Fixed Effect Counterfactual Estimators 
Notes: The above figures show the estimated dynamic treatment effects using the Stata FECT command. The bar 
plot at the bottom of each figure illustrates the number of treated units (i.e., the number of counties implemented the 
stay-at-home order) in a given week relative to the onset of the treatment. 
 
7.5 Other Robustness Checks 
We further conduct a series of robustness checks to strengthen the causal inference and lend 
support to the mechanism we proposed. First, we leverage the individual-level from CPS and 
rerun the staggered DDD analysis at the individual-month level. The analysis helps to rule out 
the effect of other individual characteristics (e.g., race, age) and thus lends support to the causal 
relationship between teleworkability and workers’ resilience. Second, we rerun our analysis with 
an alternative public policy, i.e., workplace closure, and find all results are highly consistent. 
Third, our results remain consistent when we leverage the county-level difference in terms of the 
distribution of workers in teleworkable vs. non-teleworkable jobs to examine the positive effect 
of teleworkability. Fourth, with the data regarding the monthly average unemployment benefit of 
each state from the U.S. Department of Labor, we find that our findings are consistent after 
controlling for the time-varying unemployment benefit across states. However, due to the page 
limit, detailed results are omitted. 
8. Discussion and Conclusion 
The catastrophic advent of COVID-19 raises an emphatic debate on how to improve societal 
resilience in facing a crisis such as a pandemic that disrupts life and workplace. We add to the 
emerging literature on the economic consequences of COVID-19 and societal resilience by 
investigating the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience and its heterogeneity 
across different broadband coverages, job characteristics, and genders. Leveraging the staggered 
implementation of the stay-at-home order across counties, our DDD estimate suggests that the 
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stay-at-home order increases non-teleworkable workers’ unemployment rate by 0.114, work 
absence rate by 0.146, and layoff by 0.110. We find that teleworkable workers significantly have 
a lower unemployment rate, work absences rate, and layoff rate than non-teleworkable workers 
under the stay-at-home order. Compared with those non-teleworkable workers in the same 
county, teleworkability can offset the increase in the unemployment rate due to the stay-at-home 
order by 51.5%, that in the work absence rate by 54.9%, and that in the layoff rate by 51.7%. We 
further show that the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience is i) stronger for 
those living in areas with higher broadband coverage; ii) stronger for those whose jobs are at risk 
of being automated; iii) stronger for females without kids than their male counterparts.  
Our study has several key contributions. First, our study contributes to the growing 
literature on the economic consequences of COVID-19 by documenting the positive effect of 
teleworkability on workers’ resilience under the COVID-19 stay-at-home order. Prior literature 
on telework suggests that telework can improve workers’ productivity by reducing sick days and 
improving response time (Bloom et al. 2015). Since the beginning of COVID-19, recent working 
papers turn to focus on the measurement of teleworkability (e.g., Dingel and Neiman 2020; 
Mongey et al. 2020), demographic distributions in teleworkable vs. non-teleworkable jobs (e.g., 
Adams-Prassl et al. 2020; Béland et al. 2020), and the actual take-up rate of telework (e.g., Bick 
et al. 2020; Brynjolfsson et al. 2020). To extend this stream of literature, we leverage the 
staggered implementation of the stay-at-home order across counties to provide a rigorous 
quantification of the positive effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience. More importantly, 
we show heterogeneous impacts of teleworkability on workers’ resilience across geographic 
areas with different broadband coverages, occupations at high vs. low risk of being automated, 
and genders.  
50 
 
Second, by showing that broadband is an important complementary factor to 
teleworkability, our study deepens our understanding of the consequences of digital inequality. 
While prior studies suggest that broadband accessibility can help to increase married women’s 
labor force participation (e.g., Dettling 2017), whether and how broadband accessibility 
moderates the impact of teleworkability on workers’ resilience to COVID-related labor market 
disruptions is far from clear. Moreover, there is increasing public attention on the issue of digital 
inequality, such as inequality in broadband coverage, and its potential impact on income 
inequality.31 To answer this call, we show that low broadband coverage can limit the positive 
effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience, which may subsequently widen the income gap 
across areas.   
Third, we contribute to the debate on the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and 
automation on the labor market by inquiring into the role of teleworkability in enhancing 
workers’ resilience and its heterogeneous effects across occupations at high vs. low risk of being 
automated. According to prior literature on the relationship between economic downturns and 
automation (e.g., Zhang 2019), firms tend to have a strong incentive to adopt automation when 
their productivity levels are low (e.g., during the pandemic) and displace workers in those 
automatable occupations. The accelerated pace of AI’s replacement of human workers during the 
pandemic is supported by anecdotal evidence.32 We show that teleworkability can help workers 
maintain their productivity during the pandemic, which is likely to slow down the replacement of 










Fourth, we contribute to the literature on gender inequality by highlighting the critical 
importance of teleworkability. Prior studies on gender inequality suggest that females tend to 
have a higher need for flexibility (e.g., Mas and Pallais 2017) and a short commute (Barbanchon 
et al. 2020). As such, telework has the potential to narrow the gender inequality in employment. 
We find that, among workers who don’t have kids, females tend to benefit more from 
teleworkability than their male counterparts in the same county. However, compared with 
females without childcare constraints, the positive effect of teleworkability is weaker for females 
with childcare constraints. 
Our study has important implications. First, for governors, it is imperative to improve the 
current state of Internet access through broadband and increased affordability. Specifically, the 
government should expand Internet accessibility via broadband and free hotspots, especially for 
those areas with low broadband coverage. Further, to help to narrow the digital inequality gap, 
the government should consider subsidizing broadband and phone expenses for low-income 
families or putting a cap on the price for broadband access in economically vulnerable areas. 
Second, firms should pay more attention to the heterogeneous positive effect of telework across 
workers. For instance, females may need flexibility more and would like to telework more. To 
make their teams more agile, firms are also advised to provide better training and more guidance 
on how to telework and how to collaborate with teleworking colleagues. Third, for some workers 
(e.g., females, workers in automatable jobs), since teleworkability is more important to their 
resilience, they should acquire more telework soft skills and improve their home technologies 
(e.g., Internet, computers) to maximize their telework productivity. For those workers who lost 
their jobs during the pandemic, they should take this time to upskill themselves so that they can 
qualify for those non-automatable jobs that need more preparation and cognitive skills. 
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 Our work is not without limitations. Our study focuses on the impact of occupation-based 
teleworkability instead of the actual take-up of telework. Future studies can further examine how 
various socio-economic factors and firm-level characteristics affect workers’ take-up of telework 
and their job performance. Moreover, given that BLS only publishes monthly data regarding 
workers’ employment, there may be a time delay between the change in workers’ actual 
employment status and the census data, which implies that our estimate may be conservative. If 
there are more frequent data collection regarding workers’ employment status, future research 
could closely analyze the dynamic relationship between the pandemic progress and workers’ 
employment status both in the short-term and long-term. Lastly, the study only considers the 
average effect of teleworkability on workers’ resilience across areas and occupations. It would be 
interesting to see the dynamics of workers’ employment status change (e.g., the transition from 
unemployed to employed and vice versa) by supplementing the employment data with both job 
opening data and job turnover data. 
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